Estimating a fiscal reaction function: the case of debt sustainability in Brazil by Mello, Luiz de
www.ssoar.info
Estimating a fiscal reaction function: the case of
debt sustainability in Brazil
Mello, Luiz de
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Mello, L. d. (2008). Estimating a fiscal reaction function: the case of debt sustainability in Brazil. Applied Economics,
40(3), 271-284. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840500461873
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-239492
For Peer Review
ESTIMATING A FISCAL REACTION FUNCTION: THE CASE OF DEBT 
SUSTAINABILITY IN BRAZIL 
Journal: Applied Economics 
Manuscript ID: APE-05-0201.R1 
Journal Selection: Applied Economics 
Date Submitted by the 
Author:
26-Oct-2005 
JEL Code:
E62 - Fiscal Policy|Public Expenditures, Investment, and 
Finance|Taxation < , H63 - Debt|Debt Management < , H62 - 
Deficit|Surplus <  
Keywords: fiscal reaction function, Brazil, fiscal rules, debt sustainability 
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
For Peer Review
1
ESTIMATING A FISCAL REACTION FUNCTION: THE CASE OF DEBT SUSTAINABILITY IN 
BRAZIL
Luiz de Mello1
Abstract
This paper reviews recent trends in fiscal performance in Brazil, estimates fiscal reaction functions for the 
consolidated public sector and different levels of government, and tests for the sustainability of the public 
debt dynamics. The empirical analysis, based on monthly data for the period 1995-2004, suggests that all 
levels of government react strongly to changes in indebtedness by adjusting their primary budget surplus 
targets. In addition, the central government appears to follow a spend-and-tax policy: changes in revenue 
are affected strongly by expenditure. About two-thirds of changes in primary spending are offset by higher 
revenue over the longer term. Institutions are also found to matter for fiscal sustainability. The 
responsiveness of the sub-national fiscal stance to indebtedness, as well as that of central government 
revenue to changes in primary spending, appears to become stronger after 1998, when ceilings on 
indebtedness were introduced.
JEL classification numbers: E62, H62, H63.
Keywords: Brazil, fiscal reaction function, debt sustainability, fiscal rules.
1. Introduction
Brazil’s fiscal adjustment over the past few years has been impressive. Since the floating of the real in 
1999, fiscal policy has responded forcefully to changes in the macroeconomic environment, and the 
consolidated public sector’s primary surplus targets has been raised over time to keep the debt-to-GDP 
ratio on a sustainable path. Fiscal performance has been strong even when economic activity has slowed 
down, making the fiscal effort all the more impressive. The consolidated primary surplus target was raised 
further in mid-2004 to save part of the cyclical revenue windfall while accommodating some additional 
spending in much-needed infrastructure investment. These developments are in contrast with the early 
period of macroeconomic adjustment during 1995-98, where monetary reform in mid-1994 brought 
inflation down and exposed budgetary imbalances that could previously be financed through seignorage.
The country’s strong fiscal performance owes much to a comprehensive overhaul of institutions, including 
the introduction of ceilings on indebtedness and on personnel spending during 1995-98 and the enactment 
of the Fiscal Responsibility Law in 2000. 
However, while fiscal adjustment has been instrumental in ensuring the sustainability of the public 
debt dynamics, it has been achieved predominantly by hiking revenue and cutting back public investment, 
rather than retrenching current expenditure. These developments cast doubt over the quality of fiscal 
adjustment, a problem which will need to be addressed in the years to come. Against this background, this 
paper estimates a fiscal reaction function for Brazil over the period 1995-2004. In doing so, it is possible to 
1 . Corresponding author. Mailing address: Economics Department, OECD, 2 rue André Pascal, 75775 Paris 
Cedex 16, France. Tel. (+33-1) 4524-8752, Fax. (+33-1) 4430-6165, Email: luiz.demello@oecd.org.
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2
gauge the extent to which the primary budget balance tends to be adjusted in response to changes in public 
indebtedness. Conventional cointegration-based tests are also used to assess whether the public debt 
dynamics is sustainable. Different options are considered to deal with seasonality in the budget, given the 
use of monthly data in the empirical analysis, and the effect of seasonal adjustment on the accuracy of unit 
root and cointegration tests.
The main findings of the paper are that, first, all levels of government (the consolidated public sector, 
as well as the central government and the regional governments, separately) have responded to rising 
indebtedness by increasing their primary budget surpluses; second, the fiscal reaction function is affected 
by institutions, particularly the introduction of ceilings on indebtedness at the regional government (states 
and municipalities) level in 1998; and, finally, the public debt dynamics is sustainable but, whereas central 
government revenue responds strongly to changes in spending, the converse does not appear to be true, 
characterising a spend-and-tax policy.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes recent trends in fiscal performance. 
Section 3 reports the empirical findings for the estimation of a fiscal reaction function. Section 4 discusses 
debt sustainability. Section 5 concludes.
2. Recent trends in fiscal performance
It has become customary to describe fiscal performance in Brazil since the early 1990s as a three-
period process.2 The turning points broadly coincide with monetary reform in May-July 1994, 
characterised by the introduction of a new currency -- the real -- in July 1994, and the abandonment of the 
exchange rate peg in January 1999.3
The period following the floating of the real in January 1999 has been marked, by and large, by fiscal 
conservatism (Figure 1). In an effort to stabilize the public debt-to-GDP ratio, the consolidated public 
sector -- including the central government, the social security system, the central bank, the regional 
governments (states and municipalities) and the public enterprises (all levels of government) -- has posted 
an average primary surplus of about 3.5 percent of GDP between 1999 and mid-2004. This is in sharp 
contrast with the average primary deficit of 0.4 percent of GDP during 1996-98. The deterioration of the 
primary balance was particularly pronounced following monetary reform in May-July 1994, when the 
reduction of inflation reduced the scope for deficit financing through seignorage and the erosion of the real 
value of expenditure. Fiscal effort after 1999 has also been shared across the different levels of 
government. In the early 1990s, the central government was responsible for more than one-half of the 
average primary surpluses of the consolidated public sector and sub-national finances were in persistent 
disarray. During the period 1995-98, the regional governments (states and municipalities) posted the worst 
primary balances of all three levels of government.
Consistent with higher primary surpluses, the nominal (headline) consolidated budget balance also 
improved in the post-1999 period. But it remains volatile, due to the preponderance in the public debt stock 
of securities paying floating interest rates, which makes fiscal stance overly sensitive to changes in market 
sentiment. Although nominal deficits declined after 1994 with disinflation, the operational deficit -- which 
accounts for interest payments measured in real, rather than nominal, terms – trended upwards, chiefly in 
2 . See Giambiagi and Ronci (2004), for example, for more information and Tanner and Ramos (2003) for an 
empirical analysis of fiscal dominance in the post-stabilisation period.
3 . This is confirmed by more rigorous testing. Using a Markov chain process to describe the behaviour of the 
primary balance, Rocha and Picchetti (2003) identify a regime change in 1995 (moving from a period of 
contraction to expansion) and in 1999 (moving from expansion to contraction).
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3
line with the tight monetary stance pursued after monetary reform and the lower primary surpluses posted
until 1999.
Figure 1. Budget outturn, 1991-2004
Cumulative 12-month flows (a positive sign indicates a budget surplus)
A. Primary balance
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Two main features of the post-1999 fiscal consolidation can be highlighted. First, the fiscal stance, 
measured by the primary budget balance, appears to have become more sensitive to changes in public 
indebtedness (Figure 2). Nevertheless, despite progress in fiscal consolidation and improvements in public 
debt management, indebtedness remains a source of vulnerability. On occasions of fiscal stress, public debt 
management has aimed at reducing rollover risks through the issuance of shorter-tenor securities. It has 
also responded to growing demand for foreign exchange hedge by issuing foreign exchange-indexed 
securities and foreign exchange swaps, thereby increasing the government’s foreign exchange exposure. 
Acceptance of a deterioration of the public debt indicators in conditions of financial stress is often 
predicated on the assessment that market dislocations on such occasions are predominantly technical and 
transitory. When financial conditions have been favourable, public debt management has aimed at reducing 
foreign exchange exposure, lengthening maturities and replacing floating- by fixed-rate securities.
Exposure to foreign exchange risk has been reduced considerably since 2003 due to the gradual retirement 
of foreign exchange-indexed debt.
Second, fiscal consolidation has been achieved predominantly through revenue hikes and, to a lesser 
extent, a compression of discretionary spending, particularly on investment programmes, rather than cuts 
in current outlays. To illustrate, the consolidated revenue ratio increased by about 7 percentage points 
during 1995-2003 to nearly 35 per cent of GDP, while federal investment was reduced by 0.2 percentage 
points in the period, to about 0.4 per cent of GDP in 2003, having recovered somewhat in 2004. Failure to 
retrench current spending is due in part to downward rigidities in the budget, deriving to a large extent 
from the extensive earmarking of revenue. The introduction of spending floors for several programmes
over the years, including health care and education, has also exacerbated budget inflexibility. At the same 
time, social security pressures have mounted and the creation of new expenditure commitments, 
particularly in old age-related assistance, has put additional upward pressure on current spending. These 
developments are at odds with the experience of OECD countries, which suggests that fiscal consolidation 
is more likely to be successful -- at least to the extent that it leads to a sustainable reduction in 
indebtedness -- when based on the retrenchment of current spending rather than investment cuts and 
revenue hikes.
Fiscal consolidation underpinned by tax hikes has had a detrimental impact on the efficiency of the 
tax system. While central government tax revenue has been broadly stable in relation to GDP since end-
1999, that of federal “contributions” (i.e., levies whose revenue is earmarked for specific programmes, 
particularly in the social sectors, but not shared with the regional governments) has risen steadily. 
Originally levied on enterprise turnover and payroll, reliance on these federal contributions has had a 
detrimental impact on Brazil’s trade competitiveness. The main federal contributions have now been 
converted into value added-type taxes, somewhat mitigating this problem. However, regional government 
revenue has also trended upwards, consistent with their own fiscal consolidation efforts.4 This increase in 
the tax take needs to be evaluated against the fact that Brazil already has a high revenue-to-GDP ratio in 
comparison with countries of comparable income levels, being close to the OECD average and nearly 
twice as high as that of Latin America.5
4 . The increase in state-level revenue was also facilitated by rising utility and energy prices, which are taxed 
heavily by the states.
5 . See OECD (2005), for more information.
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Figure 2. Fiscal stance and indebtedness, 1991-2004
Cumulative 12-month flows
Source : Central Bank of Brazil and IPEA.
A. Fiscal stance and indebtedness: 
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Page 5 of 19
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
6
3. Estimating a fiscal reaction function
3.1. Estimating equation
The main hypothesis to be tested when estimating a fiscal reaction function is that the government 
adjusts the primary budget balance in response to changes in indebtedness so as to ensure the sustainability 
of the debt dynamics over time. Following the empirical literature (e.g., Bohn, 1998; Gali and Perotti,
2003), the specification of fiscal reaction function is based on the government’s intertemporal budget 
constraint:
11 )()(  +++=+ ttttttttt mgmddgrb  , (1)
where tttb  =  is the ratio of primary budget surplus to GDP (with t  denoting revenue and t , 
primary expenditure, both in relation to GDP), ttt ir =  is the real interest rate (with ti  defining the 
nominal interest rate and t , inflation), tg  is the real rate of GDP growth, td  is the debt-to-GDP ratio, 
and tm  is monetary base-to-GDP ratio (t is a time index and   is the difference operator).
Assuming for algebraic simplicity that 0= tm  (i.e., no monetary financing of budget imbalances) 
and tt gr  , it then follows from Equation (1) that, for every time period, the share of the primary surplus 
in GDP can be calculated to keep the debt-to-GDP ratio constant according to 11 +

= t
t
tt
t dg
grb . When 
fiscal policy is carried out over an infinite time horizon, the share in GDP of the present value of the 
primary surplus can be calculated to equate the debt-to-GDP ratio, such that 	
=

+
+
 +
=
0
1
11 )1(j tj
jt
t Yr
B
d , 
which is independent of the rate of growth of GDP. Equation (1) can be solved forward subject to a no-
Ponzi-game transversality condition ( 0)1(lim
1 =
+ +
++

 Tt
Tt
T
r
d ) on the optimal behaviour of lenders. In other 
words, the current debt stock should be equal to the sum of expected future discounted primary budget 
surpluses. The fiscal reaction function can therefore be estimated by regressing the primary budget surplus 
on the public debt, both defined in per cent of GDP, while controlling for other determinants of the fiscal 
stance. In particular:
iiiii utCatdatbaatb ++++= )()1()1()( 3210 , (2) 
where C is a set of control variables for level of government i at time t. 
The main parameter of interest in Equation (2) is 2a , which is expected to be positively signed, 
indicating that an increase in the public debt ratio is associated with an increase in the primary budget 
surplus. Standard controls include the output gap, to capture the impact of the business cycle on the budget, 
depending on the size of automatic stabilizers, and inflation, to account for shocks to seigniorage revenues.
3.2. Data and unit root tests
Monthly data are available for all variables for the period January 1995 to July 2004 from the Central 
Bank of Brazil (BCB). The nominal budget balance (public sector borrowing requirement, PSBR) is 
calculated as the change in the public debt stock in the reference period (excluding stock adjustments), 
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which is in turn calculated on the basis of the financial sector’s total claims on the public sector and the 
central bank’s external debt register. Interest payments on the external debt and the foreign exchange-
indexed/denominated domestic debt are calculated on an accrual basis.6 The primary balances of all levels 
of government are calculated by the BCB from below the line as a residual once the operational balance is 
subtracted from the nominal balance for each level of government. Appendix Table 1 reports the 
definitions and sources of the data used in the empirical analysis.
An important question is how to deal with seasonality in the budget. The preferred option is to 
seasonally adjust the data by accumulating the monthly series over 12-month periods, but some attempt 
will also be made to use the seasonally unadjusted series because seasonal adjustment biases the outcome 
of the unit root tests towards accepting the null of unit roots. Ignoring seasonal unit roots also adversely 
affects the consistency of the coefficients in cointegration regressions (reported below). To assess the unit 
root properties of the data, three tests were performed for the seasonally adjusted series: the ADF, the 
Phillips-Perron (PP) and the Zivot-Andrews (1992) tests.7 For the seasonally unadjusted data, the 
Hylleberg et al. (1990) (HEGY) test was used. A caveat to consider when interpreting the results of the 
unit root tests is that the time span for which information is currently available is relatively short. It is well 
known that unit root tests have stronger predictive power when data are available for longer time periods. 
The results of the unit roots tests for central government expenditure and revenue are reported in 
Appendix Table 2. The lag length used to whiten the residuals was chosen on the basis of the Schwarz 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC). The regressions feature a constant term and a linear trend. On the 
basis of all three tests, both the expenditure and revenue data appear to have unit root when the variables 
are defined in levels. The public debt ratio and inflation were found to follow I(1) processes in levels
whereas the output gap was found to be I(0) in levels (results not reported). 
A final set of tests was applied to the seasonally unadjusted data to test for the presence of seasonal 
unit roots. Although the HEGY test applies to quarterly data, it was subsequently extended to monthly data 
by Beaulieu and Miron (1993), among others. The estimates of all the roots of the time-series 
representation ( 1 to 12 ) are reported in Appendix Table 3, together with the joint F-tests for 
01 == +ii  . The results suggest that the non-rejection of 01 = for primary spending and revenue 
confirm the presence of a non-seasonal unit root in the data, but not for total spending. The hypothesis of 
seasonal unit roots is rejected at the  /2 and 2 /3 frequencies for primary spending and total spending 
and for all series at the  /6 frequency.
3.3. Baseline results and the role of institutions
Estimation of the fiscal reaction function suggests that there is a positive, strong reaction of the 
consolidated primary surplus to changes in indebtedness (Table 1). An increase in net indebtedness by 1 
per cent of GDP is associated with an increase in the primary surplus of 0.03 per cent of GDP accumulated 
over a 12-month period. Sub-national fiscal stance, measured by the primary balance of the regional 
governments, does not seem to affect the budget balance of the central government at classical levels of 
6 The PSBR no longer includes the valuation changes in the stock of domestic foreign exchange-indexed 
debt accrued, but not paid in the reference period, due to exchange rate movements.
7 The main advantage of the Zivot-Andrews test over the ADF test is that it allows for the possibility of a 
one-off structural change under the alternative hypothesis and that the timing of this structural break does 
not need to be known a priori. The date of a structural break is estimated from the data as the observation 
that maximizes the absolute value of the unit root statistic. This is important because of the numerous 
changes in Brazil’s exchange rate regime, which may have a bearing on fiscal policy, causing a regime 
shift in the data generating process.
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8
significance. With regard to the control variables, the output gap is positively signed at all levels of 
government, suggesting that a cyclical downturn is associated with a lower primary balance, but the 
parameter estimate is barely significant at the 10 per cent level for the consolidated public sector. This 
provides preliminary evidence that fiscal stance is acyclical in Brazil. The baseline results are by and large 
robust to the replacement of the net debt stock by interest payments, also defined in per cent of GDP.
Estimating Equation (2) by 2SLS yields comparable results (not reported).
There is a large literature, pioneered by Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1994) and Bohn and Inman 
(1996), among others, on the relationship between budget institutions and fiscal outcomes, including in 
Latin America (Alesina et al., 1999). To assess the impact the enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility Law 
(LRF) in 2000 -- which sets a general framework for budgetary planning and execution applicable to all 
levels of government -- may have had on the government’s fiscal reaction function, a dummy variable, 
taking the value of “1” for the period after May 2000, and “0” otherwise, identifying the post-LRF period, 
was interacted with the public debt ratio. The results, also reported in Table 1, suggest that the fiscal stance 
became somewhat less responsive to indebtedness in the post-LRF period at the consolidated public sector 
and central government levels. This finding is counter-intuitive and may be attributed to the fact that most 
of the LRF-induced stabilisation may have taken place prior to the actual enactment of legislation, 
including as a result of specific legislation setting ceilings on debt and personnel spending, and that the 
post-2000 period was characterised by considerable macroeconomic volatility.
To shed further light on this hypothesis, an alternative interaction term was experimented with, 
defined for a dummy variable taking the value of “1” for the period after August 1998, and “0” otherwise, 
when ceilings on indebtedness were introduced for the regional governments by the Senate.8 The empirical 
findings suggest that, whereas in the period prior to the issuance of the Senate Resolution introducing the 
debt ceilings the reaction function of the regional governments was not responsive to indebtedness, this 
does not appear to be the case thereafter. 
The empirical findings are broadly robust to the replacement of indebtedness by government outlays 
on personnel. This is because different pieces of legislation were introduced over the years, starting in 
1995, setting ceilings on government outlays on personnel as an integral part of fiscal consolidation. The 
baseline results for the central government are also robust to the estimation of the regressions treating the 
fiscal stance of regional governments as endogenous.
8 It is important to bear in mind that debt ceilings have also been proposed for the central government, but 
legislation is yet to be approved.
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Table 1. Fiscal reaction functions, 1995-2004a
Dep. Var.: Primary budget balance in per cent of GDP
Primary balance (lagged) 0.90 *** 0.92 *** 0.90 *** 0.89 *** 0.85 *** 0.88 *** 0.85 *** 0.85 *** 0.82 ***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.048) (0.048) (0.050)
Indebtedness (lagged) 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.01 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.00 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.00
(0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017)
Indebtedness (lagged) * Post-LRF periodb -0.01 ** -0.01 *** 0.00
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Indebtedness (lagged) * Post-Senate Res. periodb 0.01 0.01 0.01 **
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Output gap (lagged) 0.02 0.02 ** 0.02 * 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Inflation (lagged) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Primary surplus (regional governments)c 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.06
(0.128) (0.127) (0.128) (0.048)
Primary surplus (public enterprises)c 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.001 0.07 0.09 *
(0.105) (0.106) (0.105) (0.002) (0.051) (0.050)
Adjusted R-squared 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97
21 1 1Baseline
Consolidated public sector
Baseline
Regional governmentsCentral government
Baseline 22
a. All equations have been estimated by OLS and contain an intercept (not reported). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent 
levels is indicated by, respectively, ***, **, and *. The sample spans the period January 1995 to July 2004 (114 observations).
b. "Post-LRF period" ("Post-Senate Res. Period") is a dummy variable taking the value of "1" for the period after May 2000 (after August 1998) and "0" otherwise.
c. "Regional governments" refers to the states and municipalities and "public enterprises" refers to all levels of government.
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4. Debt sustainability and revenue/expenditure responsiveness
4.1. Baseline results 
The results presented above can be refined to shed further light on debt sustainability. To this end, 
attention is focused on the central government to estimate the responsiveness of expenditure and revenue to 
changes in indebtedness, and to assess whether this responsiveness has been affected by the enactment of 
the Fiscal Responsibility legislation. Monthly above-the-line data on primary revenue and expenditure are 
available from the National Treasury for the central government, including the federal government, the 
central bank and the social security system. Below-the-line data on interest payment are available for the 
central government from the BCB, allowing for the calculation of total expenditure, including interest 
payment. Data constraints prevent the analysis for the consolidated public sector and for the regional 
governments, separately.
The empirical literature, pioneered by Hamilton and Flavin (1986), focuses on testing the debt 
sustainability hypothesis by assessing the stationarity properties of the budget balance and the 
cointegration properties of the revenue and expenditure series. In general, the empirical literature using 
U.S. data fails to support the sustainability hypothesis when the discount rate is time-invariant. Using U.S. 
data in the period 1950-88, and assuming a constant real discount rate, Hakkio and Rush (1991) cannot 
accept the hypothesis of cointegration between spending (including interest payment) and revenue in the 
post-1964 period, although both series are found to have unit roots. These findings are consistent with 
those reported by Trehan and Walsh (1988, 1991), who fail to accept the hypothesis that the debt is 
sustainable, despite the stationarity of the primary balance. On the other hand, if the real rate of interest is 
not constant but positive, Trehan and Walsh (1991) accept the sustainability hypothesis using U.S. data for 
1960-84 on the grounds that the overall deficit (including interest payment) is stationary. Likewise, using 
longer data series for the United States and United Kingdom, Ahmed and Rogers (1995) decompose the 
primary balance into revenue and primary spending, as Hakkio and Rush (1991), and show that revenue, 
primary spending, and real interest payments cointegrate, thereby lending support to the sustainability 
hypothesis. Evidence for other countries is more limited, with the exception of Corsetti and Roubini (1991) 
for a sample of OECD countries
There is a growing literature on debt sustainability in Brazil. Issler and Lima (2000) tests the 
sustainability hypothesis using cointegration-based tests in the spirit of the empirical analysis reported 
below using annual data for 1947-92. More recent estimates reported by Bicalho (2005), based on monthly 
data for the period 1997:12-2004:7, also support the sustainability hypothesis. The unit root-based tests 
reported by Giambiagi and Ronci (2004) for the period 1995-2002 fail to support the stationarity 
hypothesis for the discounted, rather than undiscounted, public debt. In a different strand of literature, 
Garcia and Rigobon (2004) assess the stochastic properties of the Brazilian public debt dynamics and find 
evidence in favour of sustainability in the absence of risk. The debt dynamics is also found to be affected 
by the spreads on sovereign foreign exchange-denominated debt. Pires and Bugarin (2003) focus on sub-
national indebtedness and report unit root tests for revenue and expenditure at the state level, suggesting 
that revenue is stationary, but not expenditure, which implies a deficit bias at the regional government 
level.
Conventional tests suggest that the public debt dynamics is sustainable in Brazil. On the basis of unit 
root tests, the nominal budget balance (including interest payment), revenue, primary expenditure, and total 
expenditure (including nominal interest payments) follow I(1) processes, being stationary in levels. In 
addition, cointegration tests were performed for central government expenditure (G) and revenue (T), such 
that a system ),( TGX =  can be written in error-correction form:
ttt uXXLA += 1)( , (3)
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where, as usual in its restricted form,  = ,    is the vector of cointegrating coefficients,   is 
the vector of loading coefficients, A(L) is the distributed lag operator, and tu  is a multivariate white-noise 
process.
 Based on the Johansen-Juselius multiple cointegrating vector (FIML) methodology, expenditure 
(with and without interest payments) and revenue appear to cointegrate (Table 2).9 This suggests that there 
is a stable long-run relationship between the GDP shares of the primary balance and the lagged debt stock, 
satisfying the necessary condition for debt sustainability.10 The point estimate of the cointegrating vector 
is (1, -1.06) (normalization on expenditure) when total spending is used and (1, -0.88), when only primary 
expenditure (excluding nominal interest payments) is considered. The restriction that the coefficients of the 
cointegrating vector are (1,-1) cannot be rejected at classical levels for the overall budget balance, but not 
for the primary balance. Because the period of analysis is characterised by low inflation, at least by 
Brazilian standards, the results are not sensitive to the use of real or nominal interest payments. 
To shed further light on the robustness of the results, the cointegration vector was also estimated by 
the DOLS methodology (Stock and Watson, 1993), which has the advantage that the endogeneity of the 
regressors does not affect the robustness of the estimates, being equivalent asymptotically to Johansen’s 
MLE method (Johansen, 1988). It performs well in finite samples. The results, also reported in Table 2,
suggest that the estimated coefficients for government revenue are somewhat lower than when estimated 
by the Johansen-Juselius method. Given that the time series are short, it is not possible to test for seasonal 
cointegration, using for example the maximum likelihood estimator proposed by Johansen and 
Schaumburg (1999), given that the relevant series appear to have seasonal unit roots. Nevertheless, an 
additional robustness check was carried out by re-estimating the cointegrating vectors by DOLS using the 
seasonally unadjusted data and including seasonal dummies in the regressions as an attempt to model 
deterministic, but not stochastic, seasonality. The esults suggest greater robustness in the case of primary 
spending than total expenditure. While the seasonal dummies (not reported) were found to be statistically 
significant in the model for primary central government spending, this was not the case for that including 
total expenditure.
Because a stable long-run relationship can be shown to exist between the central government 
expenditure and revenue in the VAR defined by Equation (3), where nr <<0  and r is the rank of  , 
exogeneity tests can be carried out in the tradition of Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983) and Johansen 
(1992, 1995) by imposing a restriction on the loading param ters of the cointegrating vector. The 
exogeneity tests suggest that expenditure is weakly exogenous for the cointegrating vector, regardless of 
whether interest payments are taken into account, but revenue is not. This implies that the central 
government follows a spend-and-tax strategy to keep the debt dynamics sustainable. These findings are 
consistent with those reported by Issler and Lima (2000), who report VECM estimations for the period 
9 . The lag length was selected using a variety of information criteria including Schwarz, Hannan-Quinn, and 
Akaike, and the trace statistic was corrected for small sample bias. Because the cointegration tests using 
this technique are sensitive to the choice of the deterministic elements of the VAR, a likelihood ratio test 
was used to ascertain the appropriateness of including a constant and seasonal dummies in the VAR. The 
model without time dummies, but with a constant, usually performed better than that without a constant.
10 . If the overall budget balance is stationary but expenditure and revenue do not cointegrate, sustainability is 
ensured but the deficit process is inconsistent with a constant expected real rate of interest. The literature 
also deals with the possibility of time-varying discount rates, following Bohn (1995), in a stochastic 
environment with uncertainty, on the grounds that the relevant discount rate for the purpose of debt 
sustainability is a function of the contingent probability of future debt and the intertemporal rate of 
substitution in consumption.
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1947-92 using national accounts data and suggesting that the budget in Brazil is balanced almost entirely 
through changes in revenue, regardless of how the initial imbalance was generated.
Table 2. Debt sustainability: Cointegration tests, 1998-2004a
Dep. Vars.: Central government revenue and expenditure
H0: rank = p
 p ==  0  0.16 14.57 ** 0.15 12.12 **
 p <=  1  0.03 2.14 0.07 5.24 **
Lag interval
Deterministic component
Normalized vector (on expenditure)
Johansen-Juselius method
Restriction test: Ho: (1,-1)b
Weak exogeneity tests:c
Expenditure is exogenous: Ho: (0,a)
Revenue is exogenous: Ho: (a ,0)
0.40
0.40 *** 0.45
Cointegration vectors (normalized on expenditure): Robustness checks
0.61*** 0.77 ***
1 to 5 1 to 6
Cointegration tests 
Cointegration vectors
Total expenditure (includes 
nominal interest payments)
Primary expenditure
Eigenvalue Trace Eigenvalue Trace
[0.69]
No No
(1,-1.06)(1,-0.88)
[0.23]
8.82
[0.53][0.00]
0.16 1.42
DOLSd with seasonally unadjusted data and 
seasonal dummies 
DOLSd method with seasonally adjusted data 
10.02
[0.00]
4.28
[0.04]
Source: Data available from the Central Bank of Brazil, and author’s estimations.
a. Refers to the Johansen-Juselius cointegration tests. (***) and (**) indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent 
levels, respectively. The sample spans the period January 1998 to July 2004 (78 observations) or January 1997 to July 2004 (90 
observations) when the seasonally unadjusted series are used.
b. Disctributed as chi-squared, with 1 degree of freedom (p-values in brackets).
c. Based on the estimated cointegrating vector of rank equal to one and distributed as chi-squared, with 1 degree of freedom (p-
values in brackets).
d. Based on the OLS estimation of the following equation: 
t
i
it
i
it
i
it
i
ittt uRaRaGaGaRaaG ++++++= 				
=

=

=

=
+
2,1
5
2,1
4
2,1
3
2,1
210
, where G and R denote, respectively, 
government expenditure and revenue. The number reported is 1a .
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4.2. Error-correction representation
On the grounds that expenditure seems to be weakly exogenous, an error-correction representation of 
the fiscal reaction function can now be used to assess the short-term response of fiscal policy mix to 
indebtedness, taking other determinants of the fiscal stance into account. The findings, reported in Table 3, 
suggest that changes in revenue are affected strongly by expenditure: about two-thirds of changes in 
primary spending are offset by higher revenue over the long term. The long-run response of revenue to 
total expenditure (including interest payments) is much lower, at about 15 per cent.11 In comparison with 
the results reported in Table 1, the output gap remains insignificant at classical levels but inflation now 
appears to have a statistically significant, albeit small, effect on revenue over the long term. The fiscal 
stance of the regional governments now seems to affect revenue at the central government level, at least in 
the short run, suggesting that the central government may compensate for weaker budget outturns at the 
sub-national level by increasing its own fiscal effort. Moreover, the error-correction results lend further 
support to the hypothesis that institutions affect the government’s fiscal reaction function. The 
responsiveness of revenue to changes in primary spending appears to have increased, albeit by a small 
magnitude, after the issuance in 1998 of legislation setting ceilings on indebtedness. 
In so far as the effect of regional government finances on the fiscal stance of the central government 
and the role of institutions are concerned, the findings of the error-correction estimations, while interesting, 
are not robust to the inclusion of interest payments in central government expenditure. This is nevertheless 
not surprising, given the volatility of nominal interest payments in Brazil, which reflects, as discussed 
above, the composition of the public debt stock and, consequently, the sensitivity of debt dynamics to 
changes in market conditions.
5. Conclusions
This paper reviewed trends in fiscal performance in Brazil since the early 1990s, reported empirical 
findings on the estimation of a fiscal reaction function for the consolidated public sector, as well as the 
central and regional governments separately, and assessed the sustainability of the public debt dynamics 
using standard unit root and cointegration tests. Some attempt is made to deal with seasonality in the 
budget by considering both seasonally adjusted and unadjusted series on account of the effect seasonal 
adjustment has on the accuracy of unit root and cointegration tests. Of course, due to the short sample for 
which information is currently available, and given the constraints imposed on hypothesis testing by 
seasonality in the fiscal data, the empirical findings should be interpreted as indicative, rather than 
conclusive that, first, all levels of government react strongly to changes in indebtedness by adjusting their 
primary surplus targets; second, this reaction to indebtedness has been strengthened at the sub-national 
level through the introduction of debt-constraining legislation in 1998; and, finally, the debt dynamics 
appears to be sustainable, with the central government following a spend-and-tax policy to ensure debt 
sustainability: changes in central government revenue are affected strongly by expenditure, with about 
two-thirds of changes in primary spending being offset through higher revenue over the long term, but the 
long-term response of revenue to total expenditure (including interest payments) is lower in magnitude, at 
about 15 per cent. 
On the basis of these findings, Brazil will need to continue to post sizeable primary budget surpluses 
in the years to come to allay concern about the sustainability of the country’s public debt dynamics. Only a 
reduction in the public debt-to-GDP ratio over a prolonged period will mitigate this source of 
macroeconomic vulnerability, making the economy better equipped to withstand adverse shocks. This 
should include, at the same time, continued effort to strengthen public debt management, by for example 
11 See Kollias and Makrydakis (2000) for evidence of spend-and-tax behaviour in a sample of European 
countries.
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continuing to improve its composition and thereby reducing government exposure to exchange and short-
term interest rate risk.
In addition, while focusing policies on ensuring that the primary surplus targets are met, effort is 
needed to improve the quality and longer-term sustainability of fiscal consolidation. In particular, a 
sustained retrenchment in current expenditure would pave the way for reducing the tax burden over the 
longer-term, once fiscal consolidation has delivered an appreciable fall in indebtedness. Moreover, 
reducing expenditure rigidities, while avoiding disruption in service delivery in the event of revenue 
shortfalls, should be a key policy objective in the years to come. More importantly, the merits of continued 
revenue earmarking and mandated spending should be assessed against the impact these budgetary 
resources might have on policy outcomes, particularly in the social area.
Table 3. Fiscal reaction functions: Error-correction models, 1997-2004a
Dep. Var.: Central government revenue in per cent of GDP
Change in revenue (lagged) 0.21 * 0.22 *
(0.118) (0.114)
Revenue (lagged) -0.34 *** -0.40 *** -0.15 ** -0.17 **
(0.092) (0.093) (0.065) (0.066)
Expenditure (lagged) 0.20 *** 0.24 *** 0.02 ** 0.02 **
(0.069) (0.069) (0.012) (0.012)
Indebtedness (lagged) 0.005 -0.02 -0.001 -0.010
(0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015)
Indebtedness (lagged) * Post-Senate Resolution period 0.01 ** 0.01
(0.005) (0.005)
Output gap (lagged) -0.005 -0.003 0.01 0.01
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005)
Inflation (lagged) 0.01 ** 0.01 *** 0.01 ** 0.01 **
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Change in primary surplus (regional governments)b -0.42 * -0.50 **
(0.243) (0.237)
Primary surplus (regional governments)b 0.36 ** 0.41 *** 0.14 0.14
(0.150) (0.146) (0.128) (0.128)
Change in primary surplus (state-owned enterprises)b 0.35 ** 0.28 * 0.19 0.13
(0.172) (0.168) (0.170) (0.173)
Adjusted R-squared 0.15 0.21 0.09 0.10
Memorandum item:
Implied long-term expenditure coefficient 0.59 0.60 0.13 0.12
Primary expenditure Total expenditure 
(includes nominal 
interest payments)
1 2 1 2
Source: Data available from the Central Bank of Brazil, and OECD estimations.
a. All equations have been estimated by OLS and contain an intercept (not reported). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels is indicated by, respectively, ***, **, and *. The sample spans the period 
January 1998 to July 2004 (78 observations).
b. "Regional governments" refers to the states and municipalities, and "state-owned enterprises" refers to all levels of government.
Page 14 of 19
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
15
REFERENCES
Ahmed, S. and J.H. Rogers (1995), “Government Budget Deficits and Trade Deficits: Are Present Value 
Constraints Satisfied in the Long-Term Data?,” International Finance Section Discussion Paper No. 
494, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.
Alesina, A., R. Hausman, R. Hommes, and E. Stein (1999), “Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in 
Latin America”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 59, pp. 253–273.
Beaulieu, J.J. and Miron, J.A. (1993), “Seasonal Unit Roots in Aggregate U.S. data”, Journal of
Econometrics, Vol. 55, pp. 305-328.
Bicalho, A. (2005), “Teste de Sustentabilidade e Ajuste Fiscal no Brasil Pós-Real”, Getúlio Vargas 
Foundation, Unpublisged manuscript. 
Bohn, H. (1995), “The Sustainability of the Budget Deficit in a Stochastic Economy,” Journal of Money, 
Credit, and Banking, Vol. 27, pp. 257-71. 
Bohn, H. (1998), “The Behavior of U. S. Public Debt and Deficits”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 
113, pp. 949–963.
Bohn, H., and R.P. Inman (1996), “Balanced Budget Rules and Public Deficits: Evidence from The U.S. 
States”, NBER Working Paper No. 5533.
Corsetti, G. and N. Roubini (1991), “Fiscal Deficits, Public Debt, and Government Solvency: Evidence 
from OECD Countries,” Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Vol. 5, pp. 354-80.
de Mello, L. and M. Hoppe (2005), “Education Attainment in Brazil: The Experience of FUNDEF”, 
Economics Department Working Paper No. 424, OECD, Paris. 
Eichengreen, B. and T. Bayoumi (1994), “The Political Economy of Fiscal Restrictions: Implications for 
Europe and the United States”, European Economic Review, Vol. 38, pp. 783-91.
Engle, R.F., D.F. Hendry and J.F. Richard (1983), “Exogeneity,” Econometrica, Vol. 55, pp. 277–304.
Garcia, M. and R. Rigobon (2004), “A Risk Management Approach to Emerging Market’s Sovereign Debt 
Sustainability with an application to Brazilian Data”, NBER Working Paper No. 10336, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Gali, J. and R. Perotti (2003), “Fiscal Policy and Monetary Integration in Europe,” CEPR Discussion 
Paper No. 3933, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.
Giambiagi, F. and M. Ronci (2004), “Fiscal policy and debt sustainability: Cardoso’s Brazil, 1995-2002”, 
IMF Working Paper No. 04/156, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. 
Hakkio, C.S. and M. Rush (1991), “Is the Budget Deficit Too Large?,” Economic Inquiry, Vol. 29, pp. 
429-45.
Hamilton, J.D. and M.A. Flavin (1986), “On the Limitations of Government Borrowing: A Framework for 
Empirical Testing,” American Economic Review, Vol. 76, pp. 809-19. 
Page 15 of 19
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
16
Hylleberg S., R.F. Engle, C.W.J. Granger and B.S. Yoo (1990), “Seasonal Integration and Cointegration”, 
Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 44, pp. 215-38.
Issler, J.V. and L.R. Lima (2000), “Public debt sustainability and endogenous signorage revenue in Brazil: 
time-series evidence for 1947-1992”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 62, pp. 131-47.
Johansen, S. (1988), “Statistical Analysis of Cointegration Vectors”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control, Vol. 12, pp. 231-54.
Johansen, S. (1992), “Co-integration in partial systems and the efficiency of single-equation analysis,” 
Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 52, pp. 389–402.
Johansen, S. (1995), Likelihood-based Inference in Co-integrated Vector Auto-regressive Models (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press).
Johansen, S. and E. Schaumburg (1999), “Likelihood Analysis of Seasonal Cointegration”, Journal of 
Econometrics, Vol. 88, pp. 301-39.
Kollias, C. and S. Makrydakis (2000). “Tax and Spend or Spend and Tax? Empirical Evidence from 
Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland”, Applied Economics, Vol. 32, pp. 533-46. 
OECD (2005), OECD Economic Survey of Brazil, Paris.
Pires, H.A.A. and M.S. Bugarin (2003), “Metas de Déficit: Transferências Intergovernamentais e o 
Controle do Endividamento dos Estados”, Revista Brasileira de Economia, Vol. 57, pp. 775-94. 
Rocha, F. and P. Picchetti (2003), “Fiscal adjustment in Brazil”, Revista Brasileira de Economia, Vol. 57, 
pp. 239-52.
Stock, J.H. and M.W. Watson (1993), “A Simple Estimator of Cointegrating Vectors in Higher Order 
integrated Systems”, Econometrica, Vol. 61, pp. 783-820. 
Tanner, E and A Ramos (2003): “Fiscal sustainability and monetary versus fiscal dominance: Evidence 
from Brazil, 1991–2000”, Applied Economics, Vol. 35, pp 859–73.
Trehan, B. and C.E. Walsh (1988), “Common Trends, the Government’s Budget Constraints, and Revenue 
Smoothing,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 12, pp. 425-44.
Trehan, B. and C.E. Walsh (1991), “Testing the Intertemporal Budget Constraints: Theory and 
Applications to U.S. Federal Budget and Current Account Deficits,” Journal of Money, Credit, 
and Banking, Vol. 23, pp. 206-23.
Zivot, E. and D.W. K. Andrews (1992), “Further Evidence on the Great Crash, the Oil-Price Shock, and 
the Unit Root Hypothesis,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, Vol. 10, pp. 251-70.
Page 16 of 19
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
17
APPENDIX 1: DEFINITIONS, DATA SOURCES AND UNIT ROOT TESTS
Appendix Table 1. Definitions and data sources
Variable Definition Source
Primary budget balance Below-the-line borrowing requirement of each level 
of government -- consolidated public sector, central 
government,a regional governments (states and 
municipalities), and state-owned enterprises (all 
levels of government) -- accumulated over a 12-
month period, in per cent of GDP, multiplied by 
minus one.
Central Bank of Brazil
Public debt stock End-of-period stock of net liabilities in per cent of 
GDP.
Central Bank of Brazil
Output gap Deviation of real GDP from its Hodrick-Prescott 
(HP)-filtered series.
Central Bank of Brazil
Inflation Change in IPCA index. Central Bank of Brazil
Central government primary 
revenue
Above-the-line flows accumulated over a 12-month 
period, in per cent of GDP (pagamento efetivo).
National Treasury
Central government primary 
expenditure
Above-the-line flows accumulated over a 12-month 
period, in per cent of GDP, including 
intergovernmental transfers (pagamento efetivo).
National Treasury
Central government nominal 
interest payments
Below-the-line flows accumulated over a 12-month 
period, in per cent of GDP (harmonized 
methodology).
Central Bank of Brazil
a. The central government comprises the federal government, the social security system and the Central Bank of Brazil.
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Appendix Table 2. Unit root testsa
Primary 
expenditure
Revenue Total 
expenditure
Critical 
value
ADF tests
Level -1.65 -1.93 -2.51 -4.09
First difference -4.30 -5.15 -4.71 -4.10
Phillips-Perron (PP) tests
Level
Z(rho) -6.06 -8.47 -10.31 -26.65
Z(t) -1.80 -2.30 -2.46 -4.09
First difference
Z(rho) -79.28 -73.56 -70.30 -26.62
Z(t) -8.70 -8.56 -7.98 -4.09
Zivot-Andrews tests
Level
Minimum t-statistic -3.55 -3.12 -3.05 -5.43
Break in: 2001M6 2003M6 2000M1
First difference
Minimum t-statistic -9.29 -8.88 -8.73 -5.43
Break in: 2000M11 2001M6 1999M2
a. All tests were carried out including 2 lags and a time trend. The critical value is 1% for all tests.
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Appendix Table 3. Seasonal unit root testsa
Frequency Roots Primary 
expenditure
Revenue Total 
expenditure
0 t[ 01 = ] -2.49 -2.49 -2.99 *
 t[ 02 = ] -1.33 -2.48 * -2.52 *
 /2 t[ 03 = ] -2.51 -2.26 -3.74 *
t[ 04 = ] 0.26 0.45 -0.44 *
2 /3 t[ 05 = ] -3.22 * -2.04 -3.43 *
t[ 06 = ] -0.62 0.75 0.03 *
 /3 t[ 07 = ] -1.75 -2.36 -3.97 *
t[ 08 = ] -1  -0.09 0.11 *
5 /6 t[ 09 = ] -2.44 * -2.58 -3.72 *
t[ 010 = ] 0.90 0.43 * 0.25
 /6 t[ 011 = ] -3.22 * -3.4 -3.56 *
t[ 012 = ] -1.46 * 0.53 -0.04 *
 /2 F[ 043 ==  ] 3.17 * 2.67 7.17 *
2 /3 F[ 065 ==  ] 5.44 * 2.48 5.88 *
 /3 F[ 087 ==  ] 2.05 2.79 7.87 *
5 /6 F[ 0109 ==  ] 3.55 3.48 6.62 *
 /6 F[ 01211 ==  ] 6.11 * 6.50 * 6.46 *
a. Refers to the Beaulieu and Miron (1993) seasonal unit root tests for monthly time 
series. An intercept, deterministic trend and seasonal dummies are included. The 
critical value is 10%.
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